

July 3, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

**SUBJECT: Conversation with General Taylor, July 3, 1961,
1:30 P.M.**

1. I talked with General Taylor in his Pentagon office for about 1 1/2 hours. Also present were Colonel Julian Ewell and Colonel Lawrence J. Leger. Taylor was interested in finding out how Bundy's staff operated in order to see what his own relationship should be to it. I explained the membership of the staff meeting, and the informal and somewhat fluid nature of the assignments. I indicated that the formal side of the NSC machinery was handled mainly by Bromley Smith, but that it was the purpose of the operation to get as much done on the informal level as possible. I went through the course of the Basic National Security Policy discussions in order to show just what was done in a particular case.

2. General Taylor indicated that the three methods possible for working relationship were:

- a. Depend purely on informal contact and proximity;
- b. Have a single person on his staff to act as a contact point and channel with ours;
- c. Send someone, but not necessarily the same person, to the staff meeting each morning.

Taylor indicated for the moment that he would send Col. Ewell to the staff meeting and reserve his judgment for a week or so as to what more permanent arrangement he would seek. In the course of our conversation, I indicated the possibility that we add a member to his staff for this purpose; he was not particularly responsive to this. We discussed Robert Johnson. (Note: Robert Johnson himself is not particularly desirous of being assigned to this task.)

3. In talking about the BNSP, I tried to convey the importance of adding some option to the SIOP which is relevant to a war which might break out in relation to Berlin. Taylor seemed confident that the appropriate

planning would be done even though no change in BNSP was formally made; I am not sure I got across the point about the general war aspect of Berlin planning.

Carl Kaysen